University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
Critical Reflections

Essays of Significance & Critical Reflections
2016

Mar 12th, 1:30 PM - 2:00 PM

Conditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A critique of Jorge
Gracia's proposal
Jonathan Vajda
Western Michigan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/essaysofsignificance
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Vajda, Jonathan, "Conditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A critique of Jorge Gracia's proposal" (2016).
Critical Reflections. 5.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/essaysofsignificance/2016/eos2016/5

This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in Critical Reflections by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Conditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A critique of Jorge Gracia’s proposal

1

Introduction
Jorge Gracia’s paper “The Fundamental Character of Metaphysics” (2014) proposes five
conditions that, if satisfied, would be sufficient to establish metaphysics as a fundamental
discipline for other sciences: (1) universal extension, (2) ontological neutralism, (3) sui generis
character, (4) overall disciplinary integration, and (5) necessity. After framing the relevance and
motivation for such a project, I make the case that his metaphysical project requires revision.
Not only are the conditions insufficient for fundamental character, there are problems with the
conditions themselves. His project intends to be radically inclusive, yet unintentionally excludes
certain views; and his notion of fundamentality avoids reference to establishing normative
principia, yet a key benefit of grounding is to provide such. Finally, an examination of the
individual conditions yields that his first condition is ambiguous, unclear, and problematic; his
second condition for neutrality is unworkable. Therefore, I do not preclude any and all
metaphysics from becoming fundamental; rather, I argue that to establish fundamentality it
would not be characterized as Gracia proposes.
An Order of the Sciences
Gracia’s proposal is meta-metaphysical. It is an attempt to ground the diverse sciences
with their diverse objects of study 1 upon a new scheme of metaphysics. A fundamental
science, if possible, could ask and answer the following questions about the other disciplines:
how should we different disciplines relate to one another? Should we give priority to one
discipline and its findings over another? Might one science become fundamental to all the
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That is, the object that the inquirer attends to; commonly called a ‘subject matter.’
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other sciences? The goal of this proposal is to attain unity and order across disciplines. Gracia
argues that this unity could be attained by addressing questions of fundamentality.
His current proposal for a fundamental metaphysics is a new resolution to an old
concern. Among other historic attempts, Robert Kilwardby, a contemporary of Aquinas and
archbishop of Canterbury, set out an order of the sciences (de ortu scientiarum),2 wherein the
so-called ‘first principles’ of philosophy would provide principia for natural philosophy and
other sciences. On the one hand, if an order of the sciences is present today, mathematics or
physics would be the most likely candidates with respect to providing ontological foundation
for other sciences. On the other hand, as a basis for epistemic authority, an order of sciences
may seem irrelevant, since academic disciplines often remain relatively autonomous and none
is construed to have epistemic authority over another. The desire for unification has often been
sought through interdisciplinary studies. Gracia is correct that the result has been inadequate.3
Interdisciplinary attempts are neither sufficiently exhaustive (they cannot go deep enough), nor
are their methodologies capable of arbitrating between sciences consistently.4 A fundamental
science would have robust methodology to unify the academic disciplines.
However, given the relative lack of confidence in earlier metaphysics proposals, a new
approach may be necessary. Gracia claims that a fundamental science would need to take into
2

José Filipe Silva. “Robert Kilwardby.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2014, 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/robertkilwardby/
3 “The perspective adopted by each science is by itself too narrow for the understanding of the
issues it investigate [sic] and their relation to other sciences.” Jorge J. E. Gracia. “The
Fundamental Character of Metaphysics.” 310.
4
The researcher must shift subject matter and methodology at various points unique to their
sciences; without self-consciously adopting a more fundamental methodology, she cannot
mediate among the disciplines. One must stand outside of the discipline in order to make such
determinations.
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account that history of metaphysics' successes and failures, recognizing dead-ends of previous
attempts and yet overcoming their respective limitations. Gracia has marked out what a
fundamental metaphysical discipline would be characterized by: a science that studies
everything and integrates everything together. He outlines five criteria that together would be
sufficient for such a discipline to be fundamental.
Function of Criteria for Fundamentality
Gracia offers five conditions for fundamentality. In evaluating whether these conditions
satisfy or are desirable unto a fundamental metaphysics, two matters must be discussed along
the way: what kinds of conditions are these? If they are satisfied, would Gracia’s proposal show
metaphysics to have a fundamental character? Regarding the latter question, this will be
discussed after outlining the conditions below.
Regarding the former question, it is not clear whether these criteria are to be taken as
sufficient, necessary, or sufficient and necessary conditions. On the one hand, these criteria
appear to function as necessary conditions, as his paper aims to determine “the conditions
required by fundamentality.”5 Similarly: “The fundamental character of metaphysics must then
have to do with certain conditions that must be satisfied by the claims the discipline makes and
the objects about which it makes those claims.”6 That is, for metaphysics to be fundamental,
they necessitate these conditions. On the other hand, the conditions seem to be regarded as
sufficient conditions, as he claims that the “satisfaction of these conditions would be sufficient

5
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Gracia, 305. Emphasis mine.
Gracia, 307. Emphasis mine.
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to justify the thesis that metaphysics has a fundamental character, or is fundamental.”7 This is
ambiguous.
On the assumption that Gracia is consistent, the reader ought to put these claims
together and simply posit that the conditions are both sufficient and necessary.8 On the one
hand, if he intended to merely provide sufficient conditions, then if it turns out a single criterion
were to be jettisoned or replaced, that would do little damage to his thesis. On the other hand,
if the criteria are sufficient only when held together, then the proposal suffers if but one
condition is undermined. In what follows, I will make a case that two conditions can be
undermined.
Gracia’s Five Conditions
If metaphysics could be a fundamental discipline, what character would it have?
According to Gracia, if the conditions below are satisfied, then metaphysics would possess
fundamental character. I quote:
•
•
•
•

•

7

(1c) universal extension: the object of study of metaphysics must extend to everything
that can be an object of human understanding;
(2c) ontological neutralism: the object of study of metaphysics must be conceived in
ontologically neutral terms at the outset;
(3c) sui generis character: the claims made in metaphysics about its object must not be
the same as, or overlap with, the claims made in other disciplines of learning;
(4c) overall disciplinary integration: the claims made in metaphysics about its object
must include claims that serve to understand how the claims made by other disciplines
of learning are related to, and can be integrated into, an overall consistent
understanding of the world; and
(5c) necessity: necessity is a desideratum of metaphysical claims.9

Gracia, 308. Emphasis mine.
8 That is, metaphysics has a fundamental character if and only if all five conditions are satisfied.
9
Gracia, 307.

Conditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A critique of Jorge Gracia’s proposal

5

While I will provide a fuller exposition below for the first two conditions, for now I will
briefly outline their significance: The point of the first is that for any given discipline or inquiry,
if metaphysics would be fundamental to it, then metaphysics must speak that discipline’s object
of study in some way, whether directly or indirectly. Second, ontological commitments are to
be decided later, and nothing can be excluded from the outset. Third, a fundamental
metaphysics must ask and answer distinct questions that other disciplines do not. Fourth,
metaphysics must mediate between disciplines, relating their import to one another. Fifth,
metaphysics attempts to ascertain necessary truths. A metaphysics possessing all five aspects,
according to Gracia, would make it fundamental.
Fundamentality Sufficiently Satisfied?
The conditions, as presented, do not succeed in establishing a metaphysics with
fundamental character. There are at least two concerns if it were to be admitted as a
fundamental science. Moreover, as will be explained below, there seems to be problems with
the conditions themselves. The first concern: Gracia is insufficiently inclusive even on his own
terms. As Gracia proposes a metaphysics that satisfies his first condition, he suggests that it
would investigate metaphysical matters in the following way:
“The understanding of metaphysics as the study of categories satisfies the
condition of universal extension stipulated earlier for the fundamental character
of the discipline in that it implies that metaphysics studies everything insofar as
everything we know or can know must be able to be expressed by a predicate.”
10

10

Gracia, 312.
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His proposal does not seem careful here, because there are several metaphysical theories (e.g.,
Ted Sider’s realism about structure) which explicitly seek to “go beyond the predicate.”11 It
seems as though Gracia is being unnecessarily reductionistic according to his own project's
criteria. Either Gracia must revise his metaphysical proposal in order to be inclusive (or at least
sensitive) to these kinds of projects, or else he must reject them out of hand. If the former, it is
not straight-forward how he would do so neutrally. If the latter, he would defeat one of his own
conditions: either Universal Extension or Ontological Neutralism. Either way, revision is
necessary.12
My second concern: Gracia does not appear to afford us the traditional benefits of a
fundamental science. Fundamentality allows for mediation, perhaps, but how might
metaphysics mediate without establishing the “first principles”? Yet Gracia finds limited value
in that approach.13 Mediation implies norms by which to govern the relationships between
disciplines. I have in mind that a fundamental metaphysics, if it grounds anything, would
provide some sort of principia (first principles, first philosophy), whether in the form of “logical
principles” or “ultimate causes” (not just efficient causes, but rather explanations or becauses).
Even the role of mediation assumes the possession of those principia, since it is by them it
arbitrates. If principia are not desiderata of a fundamental metaphysics, I am unaware what the
motivation for this project might be. While the fifth condition (necessity) may be included in

11

Theodore Sider. Writing the Book of the World. 85-104.
I tentatively recommend a revision that would accommodate these views as follows:
metaphysics studies everything insofar as everything we can refer to must be able to be
predicated, quantified over, or gestured at by way of analogy. This may be sufficiently inclusive
for Gracia’s aims.
13 Gracia, 305.
12
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order to preserve this very trait, Gracia does not make this connection explicit.14 Thus, his
proposal seems to be too modest to motivate pursuit.
Evaluation of the Conditions
Were the above concerns insufficient to reject Gracia's proposal as stated, some, though
not all, of the conditions he proposes are unclear, suspect, or unnecessary. I will exposit the
first two individually, commenting only briefly on the latter three.
1. Universal Extension.
Gracia proposes a radically inclusive metaphysics, such that “metaphysics should have
something to say about everything.”15 His first criterion has in view not just actual things, but
also unreal things and concepts such as “being, non-being, reality, unreality,” etc. 16 If humans
can attend their minds to something, whether concrete objects (e.g., trees) or abstract objects
(e.g., circles), metaphysics would speak to that intelligible object. However, there seems to be
two different senses of the proper object of metaphysical study.
In the first sense, the proper object of study is everything, but the method or manner by
means of which everything may be examined is unique. On this reading (which takes a cue from
the third criterion), the way tables and trees are examined is the same way that unicorns and
numbers are examined. Consider by analogy that if a physicist and a chemist study a table, they
would have the same object but different methodologies regarding it. Metaphysics would have
the widest scope possible, and thus no object would be outside of its study. This reading has

14

Gracia writes that the fifth condition is satisfied when a “metaphysics seeks to make claims
involving necessarily connections.” Gracia, 314. The phrase ‘necessary connections’ is a far cry
from an explicit goal of establishing principles or constraints for the other sciences.
15
Gracia, 307.
16
Gracia, 307.
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support as Gracia claims, “a most fundamental discipline should study not just a number of the
things that can be studied, but everything that can be studied.” 17
In the second sense, the object of study is everything, albeit indirectly. The object of
study would be macro-categories, abstractions, and any concept (possible or impossible). On
this reading, metaphysics would properly study the categories, but other things (indeed, all
things) are brought in view only by implication or indirectly. Thus, for example, a table is not a
proper object of metaphysical study; however, since metaphysics studies categories and
predicates, any predicates that apply to tables would bring tables into metaphysics’ periphery.
Metaphysics then speaks to everything indirectly as it performs its unique metaphysical task.
This reading has support as Gracia suggests that metaphysics would ask questions regarding the
most general things, 18 and that “metaphysics studies categories” 19 and that it would exclude
singular concrete objects, “such as ‘Socrates’.” 20
It is not obvious that one sense is to be preferred over the other. One way to determine
could be whether one sense may be more successful (as a sufficient condition) at providing
fundamentality. To that end, the first sense is very similar to the third criterion, such that it may
imply and obviate a separate condition. The third criterion deals with the claims of
metaphysics, as it would need to have a unique manner or method of study for its discipline
such that its claims are not dealt with by another discipline. If the first criterion is so construed,

17

Gracia, 307.
Gracia, 307.
19
Gracia, 311.
20
Gracia, 312.
18
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the third is unnecessary. However, if the second sense is preferred, it is not obvious how
Gracia’s project differs from the first principles approaches he notes to have limited success.21
The last feature of this condition is that the inclusiveness should extend to metaphysical
approaches themselves, taking into account the successes and failures of historical
metaphysical inquiries. He argues that in order for metaphysics to be fundamental it does not
need to (and must not) decide at the outset among different “reductionist”22 accounts of
metaphysics. Rather metaphysics would draw from all prior investigations in which someone
found an object worthy of study, whether an Aristotelian being qua being, or even those that
investigate Nothing or Non-being.
The acceptance of this condition has a cost. Tentatively assume as a benefit that this
condition justifies fundamentality. Not all metaphysical inquiries are equal; they have, as
admitted, “successes and failures.” 23 How could this fundamental discipline be implemented?
On the one hand it must be inclusive of such categories of non-being, and yet on the other hand
it must make determinations on the success of such approaches (so as to exclude failures). It is
unclear how the discipline would be able to regard the investigation of non-being, on the
whole, a failure: perhaps it can never make such a determination. 24 To me this is an
undesirable consequence, because it calls into question how progress in metaphysical
investigation might be possible.
21

Namely, metaphysics as fundamental via “logical principles” or via “ultimate causes.” Gracia
seems to me to be invoking here some kind of study of categories for the purpose of providing
some principia for the other disciplines. Does he escape his own concerns?
22
Gracia, 309.
23
Gracia, 308.
24
Does Gracia have in mind a descriptive enterprise, whereby metaphysicians merely
investigate categories and provide a wide taxonomy? I do not find this a likely reading.
Questions regarding what metaphysics “must” seem to invoke unexplained norms.
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2. Ontological Neutralism.
Given the condition of radical inclusivism, the condition appears to stipulate that when
including all ontological categories and methods, they must be framed neutrally so as to not
bias our development of metaphysics. This seems prima facie desirable, since a premature
judgment of a “particular conception of the discipline” would indeed eliminate metametaphysical views by implication.
Yet how is neutrality as Gracia intends even possible? Not only does every
metaphysician evaluate from a vantage (even when one has an open mind), it is not obvious
how the metaphysician can remain neutral indefinitely. Perhaps a descriptive enterprise may
have some traction, but as soon as any normative approach is involved, the metaphysician will
be invoking criteria that may not be shared by other approaches. Is there a universal norm or
principle to guide any and all meta-metaphysical views? I have doubts. Hence I call to question
whether it is “an unnecessary reductionist gimmick”25 to evaluate metaphysics from starting
point. Gracia would need to motivate how neutrality would be possible, and that having
starting points would be undesirable.
Conditions 3-5: Sui generis character; Disciplinary integration; Necessity
The latter three criteria require less commentary. The third condition simply preserves
metaphysics as a genuine discipline. Gracia is correct to assert that if metaphysics were
fundamental, then its discipline must be distinct and not simply an “aggregate of claims” made
by the other disciplines.26 Gracia's fourth condition is that it mediates across sciences, as the

25

Gracia, 309.
26 Metaphysics cannot be dependent upon the contingent and revisable claims of those
sciences it grounds.
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diversity of methods and objects imply (a) there is no singular “science” but “sciences”,27 and
(b) that particular sciences are incapable of fulfilling the role proposed for metaphysics due to
their narrow focus and perspective. 28

29

Fifth, metaphysics must make necessary claims.

Progress is the establishment of more accurate necessary claims, even if they can be called into
question or improved upon. This condition is certainly desirable, especially if the
determinations in metaphysics (if progress is possible) would have import for the disciplines
founded upon metaphysics. Hence, I have no major concern here.
Conclusion
Let’s take stock, then, what I have attempted to show. First, that the establishment of
fundamental science is desirable given historical considerations. Second, that the proposal as
stated needs revision on two fronts before it can be a fundamental science: its regarding
predication as all-inclusive is actually unintentionally exclusive; its goals should seek to establish
principia or norms for sciences. Third, when examining the individual conditions, the first has
some significant problems in implementation; the second is overly optimistic about neutrality;
the third, fourth, and fifth conditions seem necessary to the fundamental project and require no
significant revisions. Thus, I have argued that a fundamental science may perhaps be
established, but not as Gracia has proposed.

27

Gracia, 309-310. Underlining mine.
Gracia, 310.
29 Could a sub-discipline, e.g., philosophy of science or ontology proper, handle this?
28
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